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I. The Chinese Puzzle 
 
In as early as the 1950s, the historian of science, Joseph Needham, drew attention to a 
paradox which turned out to be his lifetime devotion: why growth/development in China fell 
behind the West despite the evident creativity of the Chinese civilization. This paradox, 
known also as the “Needham’s puzzle,”
1 has probably been the most challenging problem in 
economic history next to that of the “miracle” of the Industrial Revolution.
2 To be sure, either 
the Chinese puzzle or the European “miracle” can be explained in a linear growth pattern. 
  Since the 1950s, to explain why China was unable to develop the way the West did has 
become a serious enterprise in scholarship. Methodologically, a comparison between China 
and the West has developed as more or less the norm. With it, however, there is a danger of a 
normative approach. Typically, scholars (including Joseph Needham himself) have used the 
experience of Western Europe as the yardstick against which to measure China’s 
performance. This approach is problematic as it inevitably changes the issue counter-
factually to “why China was not another Western Europe?” In the 1980s, the comparative 
economic historian, Eric Jones, began to adopt a positive approach and hence departed from   2
the mainstream comparison between Europe and China. He asked instead why – given that 
by 1000 A.D. Song China had developed well ahead of other societies in Eurasia – the Song 
achievement was never repeated in China later.
3 Avoiding a universal benchmark, this “Jones 
question” marks a major step forward in both methodology and historical findings.
4  
  Nevertheless, these two approaches share the same spirit of discovering the reasons for 
China’s early supremacy and its late inferiority, a problem so fundamental to the 
understanding of the history of the world that the debate about China’s economic past has 
become a focal point among students of global history. So far, many hypotheses have been 
put forward in the bet to solve the Needham–Jonesian puzzle.
5 But there is a common 
problem: a hypotheses may well explain why China declined, it cannot satisfactorily explain 
why China rose in the first place, or vice versa. The seeming inconsistency and 
incompatibility between China's achievement and decline perpetuates China’s paradox.  
  For the current study, Chin’s paradox is really about how economic dynamics in China 
turned out to be so limited over the very long term that China fell acutely short of its 
potential for growth and development. This essay takes a positive and factual approach to 
tackle this inconsistency and incompatibility and argues that there existed mechanisms 
within the Chinese socio-economic structure which made a breakthrough beyond the Song or 
even a recurrence of the Song growth level impossible. The challenge here is how to embrace 
numerous variables in a theoretical framework to explain how rational choices led a 
sophisticated economic system to a developmental deadlock during the Imperial period (221 
B.C.– 1840 A.D.).  
 
II. A Multi-symbiotic System 
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To understand the Chinese socio-economic structure, an appropriate starting point is its 
complexity and sophistication.
6 From numerous studies of China’s past, three distinctive 
economic types can be identified according to their distinctive mechanisms of resource 
allocation (customary rule, price signal and government decision): customary, market and 
command.
7 In other words, Imperial China never had a single entity but a cluster of entities.
8 
In order to capture the peculiarity of this system and to reflect a mutual beneficial and 
interdependent relationship, the term of “a system of symbiotic entities” is preferred to that 
of “a mixed economy.”  
  Evidently, there were three main macro-components in the Chinese system. In rural China 
there was a symbiosis of “customary” and “mercantile” types (which can be called 
Component A).
9 Private in nature,
10 Component A claimed by far the largest GDP/GNP share 
in China’s total. Empirically, the balance between the “customary” and “mercantile” types 
was changeable. Under some extreme circumstances (such as civil wars and foreign 
invasions), the rural sector was able to survive without the market. Thus, it makes sense to 
define the rural sector as a “customary plus mercantile” sector leaning more towards the 
customary type.  
  This notion of “customary-mercantile” symbiosis in rural China is supported by several 
important studies. First, the rural population occupied some 80 percent of China’s total and 
produced some two-thirds of the country’s GDP.
11 Second, although commercial activities in 
the rural sector were commonplace as seen from regular fairs,
12 and large quantities of silk 
and tea for exporting,
13 and although some regional marketing rates were impressive,
14 at 
least 60 percent of the total products (70–80 percent being recognized as the norm) were not 
subject to market sale.
15 This means that the non-commercial proportion of the rural sector 
accounted for some 40–50 percent of China’s total GDP.
16  
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  In the urban private sector, there was also a symbiosis of “customary” and “mercantile” 
types (which can be called Component B). Compared with its rural counterpart, Component 
B leaned more towards the market, as the urban sector depended much on the rural sector for 
food to survive although it did provide itself with products and services. Therefore, it can be 
defined as a “mercantile plus customary” sector. Despite the fact that some cities in China 
were massive and even cosmopolitan,
17 this sector was much smaller with a ceiling of 20 
percent of China’s total population and some 30 percent of China’s total GDP (as lumped 
together with the state-run sector). Its productivity measured by per capita GDP was greater 
than unity and hence had a higher income per head than in the rural sector.
18
  The third component was partly rural and partly urban.
19 It was the state-run sector with a 
symbiosis of “command” and “mercantile” types.
20 The Chinese state was responsible for 
organizing some massive public works for the empire.
21 It was also involved in production of 
goods and trade. To show the scale of the state operation, on average the state-owned land 
occupied 13–14 percent of China’s cultivated total.
22 The state was able to control a 
considerable proportion of “key commodities” and their prices – wine, salt, iron, tea, silk, 
ingredients for medicine and so forth. The volume of goods that the imperial state was able to 
maneuver is very impressive.
23 For example, the Tang state had 83,200 metric tons of taxed 
grain (2 million picul) transported annually through canals (Zhang, Maritime Technology, p. 
56). The Northern Song increased the shipment to over 278,900 tons (6 million picul).
24 The 
Qing once raised the annual shipment further to 362,450–5,763,920 tons (5–8 million picul) 
during the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries.
25  
  Even so, Component C was smallest among the three as the state only controlled a small 
percentage of China’s wealth: government revenue during the Qing was merely 1–2 percent 
of China’s total GDP.
26 In other periods the share was likely to be under 10 percent.
27 The 
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overwhelming financial concern for the state was a balanced budget, a high proportion of 
which was earmarked for national security and defense.
28 This set up the limit for state 
economic initiatives. 
  Overall, the commercial proportion of the whole economy would at most be 60 percent (27 
percent in the rural sector, 30 percent in the urban sector, and 1–2 percent in the state sector). 
The three components were linked together by two domestic markets: that for producer and 
consumer goods/services and that for land properties. The three components were also 
connected to foreign markets. There were two distinctive price systems: the “free market” 
price and the monopoly/monopsony price. In addition, there were fiscal links between the 
two private components on the one hand and the state-run sector on the other through 
taxation on output and market transactions. Indeed, the commercial link and fiscal link 
indicate the external or inter-component symbiosis. 
  It is worth noting that foreign trade was not trivial in Imperial China over the long run. In 
the late Qing, the ratio of domestic to international trade was 2.3–3.1:1 in volume.
29 This 
reflects the degree of openness to and dependence on the foreign markets during a 
prosperous period.
30
  Given its multiple components and symbioses (both internal and external), the Chinese 
economy can thus be defined as a system of symbioses, or a “multi symbiotic system.” The 
longevity and stability of the Chinese system implied some kind of structural equilibrium in 
the economy. But the system had its ups and downs. The complexity, sophistication and the 
degree of commercialization and urbanization were by no means achieved with ease. It was a 
result of a lasting process of trial and error, and the level of prosperity was not always 
maintained. This was closely related to China’s peculiar “dynastic cycle” which was 
   6




III. Fluctuations and Limits in Performance 
 
Figure 1 reflects the main aspects of the economy under prosperity. 
 
Figure 1 appears about here 
 
In the figure, each component has its own sphere. Foreign markets can also be regarded as 
one economic sphere. Exchange and extraction (taxation) take place between the spheres. 
The foundation of China’s prosperity laid in well-established private land-ownership which 
will be dealt with later. 
  Broadly speaking, there were four periods of economic prosperity: Western Han (229 
years: 206 B.C. – 23 A.D.), Tang (289 years: 618–907), Song (319 years: 960–1279), late 
Yuan (about 50 years: 1320–68) and Ming–Qing (472 years: 1368–1840). They totaled 1,430 
years.
32 This should however be regarded as the maximum length. More realistically, the 
economic decline within the Western Han, Tang, Song and Ming–Qing, roughly 500 years, 
should also be deducted. Thus, the aggregate length of prosperity was likely to be about 44 
percent of the empire’s life-span (some 930 years for 221 B.C.– 1911 A.D.). 
  At the other end of the spectrum, the Qin (14 years: 221 B.C.–207 B.C.), East Han–Sui (593 
years: 25–618 A.D.), Five Dynasties (53 years: 907–60), early Yuan (some 50 years: 1271–
1320) were commonly recognized as the periods of economic down turn, 710 years in all. 
They occupied some one-third of the empire’s life span. If the afore-mentioned economic 
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decline within the Western Han, Tang, Song and Ming–Qing are counted, the total non-
prosperous period could well be over half the empire’s history.  
  The fundamental reasons for prosperity to end were internal shocks (corruption of the 
bureaucracy) and external shocks (alien invasions/conquests) which will be dealt with later. 
Natural disasters could and did lower the threshold for a recession but were not the cause of 
it.
33 The features of such periods are portrayed in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 appears about here 
 
  Several points can be made here. First, compared to the period of prosperity the absolute 
size of the economy reduced due to heavy losses of population, capital and land under 
cultivation. With it, the balance between the economic types and components changed. 
Second, the economy was de-commercialized with widespread commodity scarcity. But the 
market for real estate properties may have increased its proportion due to its increased 
availability as farming households went bankrupt or were simply wiped out by disasters. 
Third, the country was de-urbanized as agricultural surplus, or the exaction of it, was no 
longer able to support the same proportion of non-agricultural population as during good 
times. Finally, foreign trade became negligible. 
  Despite the decline in commercial and urban activities, the basic elements/ingredients were 
still maintained in society. The economy would flower again when the conditions were 
improved. The secret was again in the Chinese private land ownership (to be discussed later). 
The Chinese economy therefore oscillated between prosperity and recession like a never 
ending legato movement from the lowest octave to the highest and back. China seems to 
have had some sort of “floor for commercial development” (or simply “developmental 
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floor”) and “ceiling for commercial development” (or simply “developmental ceiling”). In 
terms of commercialization, the situation can be illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 appears about here 
 
  Here, conceptually, China’s total output can be portrayed by a single isoquant curve. Given 
that growth did occur over time, the isoquant curve shifts right-wards; hence from I to II. 
This can be reversed by major disasters such as wars; hence II back to I. So, the total output 
can be fluid, as growth is not always guaranteed. Based on the understanding that there was a 
division between the marketing share and the customary share of the total output of the 
Chinese economy, a high marketing–customary ratio can be represented by the parallel slop 
lines (iso-ratio lines) H-H and H’-H’ and a low marketing–customary ratio by L-L and L’-L’. 
The points of tangency a, b, c and d are equilibrium points for marketing-customary ratios 
and total outputs, showing how the economy with the given output accommodate different 
degree of commercialization within the predominant customary entourage.  
  There are five possibilities if the model is dynamic. First, the economy begins with Point a 
along Isoquant I. When, say, population growth eats out some of the marketable surplus, the 
market activities decline and the old equilibrium Point a is replaced by a new one of Point b. 
Second, the economy may starts at Point b. But as market returns increase with a demand 
shock, a larger share of the total output can be lured to market exchange. Hence, the 
economy moves to Point a. Third, if the isoquant curve shifts to a higher level due to 
extensive growth, the same momentum continues. Hence, Point a moves to Point c; or Point 
b to Point d. Fourth, if the shift to Isoquant II is driven be intensive growth and the early 
equilibrium is at Point b, a new equilibrium can be established at Point c. Finally, if an early 
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intensive growth with Isoquant I is replaced by extensive growth and the curve shifts to 
Isoquant II, Point a may shift to Point d. Hence, there is no increase in the total volume for 
trade. Or, if an early extensive growth with Isoquant I is replaced by extensive growth and 
the curve also shifts to Isoquant II, Point b may shift to Point c with an increased marketing 
share. 
  The real challenge is: Can a new equilibrium be landed beyond Point c should it be 
intensive growth from an early equilibrium at Point a? We have to rule out this possibility as 
it suggests that China could have a commercial revolution and consequently develop fully-
grown capitalism. This is counterfactual. In reality, although some elements of proto-
capitalism emerged, capitalist mercantilism and industrialization represented but a 
speculative perspective as the customary core remained unchallenged.
34 This is paradoxical: 
the market economy is conventionally viewed as superior to the customary economy seemed 
to serve, not to take over, the latter.
35 On the other hand the China never dropped beyond the 
low commercial tendency line (œ) so that the market completely lost its significance.
36  
  In the end, the economy oscillated between the high commercial tendency line (ß) and the 
low commercial tendency line (œ). The space between the œ and ß lines is China’s 
commercialization path. The customary core of the economy remained the “center of 
gravity” and determined how far and how fast commercialization/urbanization orbited.
37 
Although it is equally puzzling why market did not disappear completely during recession, to 
understand China’s developmental ceiling is a far more challenging task. Limited intensive 
growth and limited commercialization are at the very heart of the Chinese puzzle. 
  Most comparative historians have recognized this developmental ceiling either implicitly 
or explicitly. For example, Mark Elvin speaks of a “high-level equilibrium trap” referring to 
a situation where resource allocation, market capacity, technology advancement and 
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population density all reached their premodern maxima in the Qing Period;
38 while Pomeranz 
indicates a “resource endowment plateau” for the same period when China reached its 
production probability frontier with its given resource bundle.
39 Both the “trap” and “plateau” 
resemble the Ricardian “stationary state.” In that sense, the ceiling itself is known although 
Elvin and Pomeranz suggest that China reached that ceiling only once while the present 
study sees China to have experienced that several times, not just during the Qing Period. 
  Many studies imply that China’s developmental trajectory was a result of a “natural” 
course in which the Chinese had no control over, either individually or collectively. Thus, no 
one was truly responsible for China’s fate in the end. Hegel, Marx, Weber, Needham, and 
Fairbank would agree with this view to some degrees. But, according to the Institutional 
School (under the banner of Douglass North), any outcome of human society is the product 
of conscious choices, compromises and trade-offs. Thus, China’s developmental ceiling had 
to be deliberate. There was thus nothing “natural” about it. Otherwise, it becomes 
incomprehensible why and how the Chinese were able to prosper and lead the world in many 
areas for so long. To a great extent, the orthodox classical/neo-classical economists would 
agree here.  
  The crucial question here is whether the peasant economy was “free drifting” without a 
direction. A rational choice-based model rejects such a vision. So far, the “traditional peasant 
economy” in world history has been defined under three broad categories as:  
 
a) “Subsistence economy” which produces just enough for the population to survive 
without market exchange with other economic agents,
40
b) “Market economy” which is not different in nature from the urban sector,
41 and 
   11
c) “Customary-market dualistic economy” which combines subsistence needs and 
returns from market exchange.
42
 
Accordingly, in terms of economic rationality, peasant individuals have been regarded as: 
 
d) Non-market agents efficient in resource allocation to maximize utility, or “resource 
rational but non-capitalist,”
43
e) Market agents efficient in resource allocation to profit/returns, or “market rational 
and capitalist,”
44 and  




  Sufficient evidence indicates that China had the last pattern (a “customary-market dualistic 
economy,” with “dualistic utility and profit maximizers”) and the Chinese peasantry enjoyed 
the benefits of the two worlds in a symbiotic way: the customary economy produced secured 
livelihoods; and the market economy, the icing on the cake.  
  Now, assuming that the Chinese peasantry played the critical role in determining China’s 
developmental ceiling on condition that individual peasants made similar choices in both the 
short run and long run, one has to face the following question: “How could similar choices 
(and thus similar behavioral patterns) be shared by so many relatively independent 
individuals?” This was only possible if there existed similar economic incentives for these 
individuals. To have similar economic incentives require similar economic conditions, 
especially similar institutions, for those individuals. Then, convergency will emerge in an 
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ocean of rational choice-makers. Such convergency determines the orientation of the 
economy. 
  At this point, it is critical to understand that the customary element and the market element 
within the rural sector were not mutually exclusive but complementary to each other (and 
hence symbiotic). From the respectable living standards during the Qing period, the 
symbiotic economy was able to deliver desirable results.
46  
 
IV. Origin: State-building and Changed Institutions 
 
To understand China’s developmental ceiling, it is vital to know how it began. The findings 
of the present research suggest that what led China to its ceiling had much to do with its 
state-building process during the Warring States Period (475 B.C.–221 B.C.) which led to a 
new economic order with a new state, new property rights, a new peasantry and after all a 
new production function. 
  China had probably the most developed private landholding systems in the premodern 
world. Chinese family-cum-farms were created by the seventh century B.C., probably at the 
grassroots level through trial and error (see Table 1). It was a quiet revolution and did not 
change the economy dramatically. That was until the new land ownership type encountered 
with newly emerged state-building during the Warring States Period.  
 
Table 1 appears about here 
 
  This state-building process was triggered by a military revolution which was marked by 
development in three areas (1) the use of iron for lighter and tougher weapons to replace 
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bronze, (2) the emergence of cavalry with unprecedented speed and maneuverability, and (3) 
the spread of new military tactics embodied in Sunzi’s art of war (Sunzi Bingfa, Master Sun’s 
Art of War) of the fifth century B.C.
47 This was a full scale military revolution which 
eventually tipped the political balance among the numerous units (as many as 160).
48 So, it is 
not accident that in the period from 475 B.C. to 221 B.C., the pursuit of hegemony was 
replaced by the ambition to annex other political units to gain the advantage of size for more 
resources to get the upper hand in a changed game. Indeed, a case of economies of scale. So, 
steadily, the number of political units was reduced from three digits to two and a single in the 
convergent process of political unification. 
  This process of unification was at the same time a process of state-building as a new type 
of state began to take shape, develop and replace the old type. The new state was centrally 
controlled in line with a military command system, manned by salary-paid bureaucrats 
holding uninhabitable offices.
49 This suited well with rapid territorial expansion without the 
constraint associated with personal links under feudalism. Constant wars also change the 
composition of the military forces. Instead of using professional soldiers, large numbers of 
new recruits were in high demand from all walks of life. To finance the war, the state needed 
new and stable sources of revenue. 
  Among many trades, the agricultural sector seemed to fill the bill the best by supplying 
labor-toughened and relatively disciplined and simple-minded males. The sector also 
provided the state food and revenue, crucial for sustaining military operations. In addition, 
peasant settlers and re-settlers in newly capture areas served as permanent occupation forces, 
a cheap and effective way to control the new territory. 
  To encourage and reward the peasantry in an exchange for its support of the wars and 
territorial expansion, a new institution emerged which was marked by private property rights 
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with the focus on private land-ownership. The age-old chessboard-field system of a 
communal land-ownership (jingtianzhi) was ended. After that, China’s land-ownership as a 
whole was not changed until the early 1950s when communists decided to copy 
collectivization from Stalin.  
  To complete the new institution, a law for equal inheritance of real estate was added 
together with a law for land registration.
50 This was a major milestone of institutional change 
in that the biological or family link was for the first time legally hooked to landholding. This 
change fuelled the momentum of the new landholding type via human reproduction cycles. 
With it, the existing practice of ancestral worship and lineage expansion became an 
economic driving force: as family properties were legally passed on through the bloodline, 
ancestral worship and lineage expansion began to make economic sense. Chinese lineage 
helped a great deal in enshrining private land ownership. An institutional chain reaction also 
followed: the protection of the private land-ownership and equal inheritance remained 
became the core of civil code under the Tang (618–907), Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–
1644).
51
  Therefore, by the fourth century B.C. all the main players in China adopted the new sate 
and new land ownership in a frenzy in the fear that they may have been defeated and 
annexed. And, private land-ownership was widely spread in established farming zones. It can 
be assumed that by then private land-ownership had reached the “critical mass” to tip the 
balance between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Meanwhile, the incentives on 
the state’s part were so strong that tax advantages and private land-ownership were offered to 
lure farmers from rival kingdoms (called laimin, literally “attracting immigrants”). A 
symbiosis between the landholding peasantry and the fiscal state began to form. 
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  This combination of a landholding peasantry and a fiscal state slowly transformed China 
during the second half of the Warring States Period. The result of the new state-building was 
a package of new army, new administration and new economic institutions. They were 
anything but feudal. Given that the new state was free from the kind of constraints traditional 
associated with decentralized feudalism, it had a strong tendency to expand across a vast 
territory: the geographic barrier such as high mountains and seas were the only limits. 
Because of that, this state-building was at the same time empire-building. The Qin Kingdom 
successfully combined the two in one and hence ended the lasting Warring State Period. 
  In this context, early China was far less static and far less homogeneous than one may 
think; and consequently adopting this choice was far less straightforward and far less smooth 
than one might imagine. Undoubtedly, state-building (and hence the new state) played the 
key role in endorsing the new property rights which were designed for the peasantry and not 
necessarily extended to other strata.
52 Equally undoubtedly, during the Warring States Period, 
a new production function with a new production probability frontier became entrenched in 
the Chinese economy which had profound impact on China’s resource allocation and 
developmental trajectory of the long run. 
  It is important to understand that the new production function was coupled with a Pareto 
optimum with which both the peasantry and the state gained. The new ownership type 
generated incentives for farmers to produce more and better for tangible rewards. It also 
effectively eliminated free riding under the previous communal systems.
53 This in turn 
attracted re-investment back in the rural sector. The state benefited from more revenue and 
well-fed soldiers and hence greater economic and military power.
54 After Shang Yang’s 
reform, the Qin – once a poor kingdom on the marginal land of the northwestern plateau – 
succeeded in maximizing revenue and fighting men which in turn enabled the Qin to 
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captured more and more territory.
55 With Qin’s victory, the militia-peasantry was rewarded 
promptly under a nation-wide scheme launched in 216 B.C. which created a virtuous win-win 
spiral and eventually paved the way for the establishment of the Qin Empire.
56 So, Qin’s 
victory in unification was the victory of the peasant–state alliance.
57 The state-peasant 
interdependence led to a symbiosis. 
  Certainly, the new economic order had some unintended consequences in the long run. 
Firstly, franchised and replicated, the military conquest-backed private land-ownership 
prevailed on East Asian mainland in the process of empire-building under the Qin.
58 This 
created for the first time a high degree of homogeneity in the economy which was seen as 
agricultural dominance. It also means that the private economy became the dominant type. 
Secondly, an often-neglected point, the Chinese landholding system was compatible with the 
“diseconomies of scale” in farming.
59 This means that large-scale landholding under slavery, 
feudalism or communism had no productive advantage. Secondly, the new system locked the 
peasantry in the rural economy as farmers became reluctant to leave land which they had 
property rights on. China thus had a clear pattern of “personified private landholding” vis-à-
vis the Marxian “personified capital” in capitalist Europe. Thirdly, incentives for farmers to 
produce more and better under the new landholding system allowed the customary-
mercantile symbiosis to thrive at the household level, the very cell of the rural economy, to 
achieve an economic optimum. With it, the aforementioned rural “customary plus 
mercantile” sector took shape. Last but not the least, as rural males were obliged to serve in 
the army for national defense, the peasantry had its vote with arms in China’s politics.
60
  In terms of state finance, the alliance with the peasantry determined a principle of 
“jackpot” (similar to a lottery hence the name) that was adopted by the fiscal state: to collect 
huge aggregate revenue from a large population with a small sum per capita.
61 This principle 
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was benevolent for individual peasants. It had the obvious benefit of economies of scale from 
the state point of view (as long as the size of the political unit was big enough to make the 
jackpot worthwhile).
62 Indeed, it was the economies of scale that underwrote the benevolent 
regime of low taxation. Nevertheless, this marked the beginning of the state financial 
dependence on the rural economy. Such dependence lasted until the end of the imperial 
period, as seen from the break down of the Qing tax income in 1652–1766. In Table 2, the 
ratio between direct tax (I) and indirect taxes (II) reflects the symbiotic nature of the 
economy under the rural dominance as the land-poll tax and grain tax claimed by far the 
largest share of the state revenue.
63
 
Table 2 appears about here 
 
V. New Production Function and Higher Standards of Living 
 
Now, looking back at the three key factors (the land-holding peasantry, the physiocratic state 
and supply of land), they almost certainly reinforced and perpetuated a particular type of 
private economy where decentralized individual rational choices became more or less 
convergent in society. This ultimately determined a balance between the customary and 
mercantile activities and thus the developmental ceiling for the economy. In the jargon of 
economics, what is so peculiar of the Chinese economy is its production function that had 
self-regulating mechanisms against run-away commercialization and capitalism: 
 
 
    Q = ƒ (L, K, R, T, G, M, ...)
64
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Where Q is the total output with its specific composition for an economy. In post-Qin 
Imperial China, most of the Q was made of agricultural products in both volume and value. 
The volume of Q is the function of a set of input variables. L is labor input with its bias of 
specialization determined by returns. In the Imperial era, this L had strong bias towards 
farming as the vast majority of population was related to farming. K is capital (including 
land) input with its preference among different sectors due to returns. In Imperial China, high 
yielding agriculture remained as the single largest investment recipient among all sectors. 
This investment bias was incentivized by private property rights. R is the impact of resource 
endowments with their natural favor towards certain sectors also due to returns. In China, the 
climatic pattern, hydraulic pattern and soil types are in favor of farming from Manchuria to 
Yellow River, Yangtze River and Pearl River. T is the input of technology with its bias due 
to relative prices of resources. China’s resource endowments, labor skills and landholding 
rights steered its technological development in favor of agriculture.
65 G lumps together the 
input/impact of the state and other institutions including law, order and property rights which 
secure returns from economic activities for certain sectors. In Imperial China, there was a 
package of a state-peasant alliance, physiocratic government (or simply “agrocracy”) and 
landholding property rights. M is the impact of the scale and scope of market exchange 
activities among different sectors. 
  Figure 4 portrays how Chinese population was benefited from the establishment of the new 
production function.  
 
Figure 4 appears about here 
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Evidence suggests that China had a mixed economy before the Qin Period.
66 To show that, 
Figure 4 has Point a, a 50-50 combination of agricultural output (at f) and non-agricultural 
output (at g), as the starting point. It is reasonable also to assume that (1) the resource 
allocation at Point a was optimal. Thus Point a sits on the first production-probability 
frontier marked by P-P. Such an economy offers an income at the level of I-I where the 
population consumes the combination of f and g.  
  The new production function, which can now be defined as the “Qin production function,” 
provided China with a new development horizon and promised a new production-probability 
frontier marked by P’-P’ where a greater total output of goods of both sectors could be 
produced. But it normally takes time for an economy to reach optimal resource allocation. 
So, we suppose that in the beginning, the economy with the Qin production function only 
managed to reach Point b with the bias towards agriculture (at f’ where the agricultural 
output increased in both relative and absolute terms) but within the production-probability 
frontier. So, the full potential of the Qin production function was yet to be fully realized.  
  The new growth is undoubtedly achieved at the expense of the non-agricultural sector (as 
its output drops from g to g’), hence incurring considerable social and private costs in 
society. However, as long as such costs were generously offset by social and private benefits 
with net social and private gains, the change was unstoppable. This was resulted in higher 
standards of living at II-II where the bundle of consumer goods for the general public was 
enlarged. This was not all: material life could be improved further by better resource 
allocation by moving Point b to Point c. With trade,
67 the income level reached III-III despite 
the fact that the economy went further towards agricultural dominance (from f’ to f’’). From 
the Tang Period on, especially during the Ming–Qing Period, the strong growth in China’s 
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tea and silk export to feed the world demand and China’s respectable standards of living 
support our claim.
68  
  Here the key issue is not commercialization (which at most is a means) but standards of 
living (which is the ultimate end for all economic activities). In other words, a high living 
standard justifies the raison d’être of the Qin production function.
69
  All this is completely compatible with Figure 3, as the mechanisms demonstrated in Figure 
4 dictate those in Figure 3.  
 
VI. From Incentives to Equilibrium 
 
Given that in Imperial China, the economy was fundamentally private and autonomous, we 
must assume that any equilibrium could only be reached voluntarily by the choices of the 
majority in society. If voluntary, such choices had to be rational. If rational, choices had to be 
guided by economic incentives. These incentives had to be derived from particular 
institutions. 
  First, the Chinese landholding system generated strong incentives for the farmer to stay in 
agriculture as his lifetime employment, income, pension, returns from investment (including 
skills and materials) and the sense of control over his own life depended largely on land. As a 
result, even in commercially prosperous eighteenth-century, as much as 92 percent of the 
registered land in China was privately owned.
70 Among these property owners, smallholders 
were the majority.
71 The hangover of this system can be felt strongly in modern times: up to 
the 1930s, at least 70 percent of rural households still belonged to the category of 
freeholders,
72 although the acreage of landholding varied.
73 This explains well why in 
Imperial China owning land was such an essential agenda among the ordinary Chinese that it 
   21
became a national obsession (at least from a Western European viewpoint). To conceptualize 
this hyper propensity for land ownership, the opportunity costs for peasants to lose land (and 
hence to leave agriculture) must have been very high; so high that only extra-economic force 
was able to separate him from his land. 
  Second, the Chinese landholding gave the peasantry strong incentives to produce more and 
better in order to improve their material life. China’s premodern high-yield farming is well 
known. As a result, surplus was produced regularly and regular market exchange became 
both feasible and necessary. Agricultural seasonality, which dropped the marginal product of 
labor in farming to zero during low seasons, created a strong incentive for peasants to take up 
sideline to produce for the market to increase income rather than to idle for pleasure.
74 
Instead of harming his farming, peasant sideline skills and occupations reinforced his 
customary-mercantile existence as he maximized his utility and income with evenly 
distributed resources to match the farming seasonality. Thus, as long as he had a sideline, his 
marginal product of labor avoided the “zero trap.” Therefore, persistence of rural sideline 
undertakings simply means that the peasant marginal product of labor remained positive all 
the year round. This was most obvious in North China. In South China where multiple 
cropping was practiced, agricultural seasonality became blurred, as farming became an all-
the-year-round occupation. This also encouraged sideline production, not because of the 
rational avoidance of the “zero trap,” but due to an increased agricultural surplus which 
supported a wide range of non-farming economic activities.
75 In essence, what supported 
commercial activities in Imperial China was agricultural surplus, either spare time-driven (as 
seen in the northern seasonality) or spare produce-driven (as seen in the southern high yield). 
Here, what the peasant aimed at was not economies of scale but “economies of scope.” 
Chinese peasants were no doubt economic optimizers. 
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  Third, although the amount of surplus produced by the rural sector was technology-elastic, 
technological development took time in the premodern world. The chance to have a surplus 
windfall was thin. Without imports of foreign food in large quantities, the limited margin of 
surplus from the rural sector ultimately dictated the degree of urbanization. Therefore, an 
urbanization-driven commercialization model did not work for China. After all, historically, 
although agricultural surplus could “automatically” lead to market exchange (common in 
many civilizations), market activities would not “automatically” lead to capitalism (only in 
part of Western Europe). 
  Fourth, as the peasant made economic decisions and the rural market network served him 
well,
76 there was a phenomenon of “entrepreneurialization of the peasantry” in China: an 
ordinary peasant participated regularly and actively in the market by trading a considerable 
percentage of his output.
77 The aggregate trading of millions of individual peasants accounted 
for about half China’s total marketing in a prosperous period.
78 But there was a catch: the 
existence of millions of amateur peasant marketeers (or simply semi-merchants) put a 
formidable check on the growth of the professional merchant class: since in the rural sector 
entry to the market was low and the market seemed to be cleared most of time in the hands of 
ordinary peasant-traders, a professional merchant faced a crowding-out effect.
79 A check also 
came from the state that effectively controlled key commodities.
80 The market share (in value 
traded) left for the professional merchants was only about half of China’s total during 
commercial heydays, a fact that has been badly overlooked.
81 The growth of professional 
merchants was sandwiched, as their services were by-passed and marginalized by the state 
and peasantry. The merchant activities tended to concentrate on four areas: luxuries, 
wholesale, long distance trade (between internal macro-regions and beyond China’s territory) 
and money dealing (including trading government licenses).
82 These were the areas that 
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peasants could not afford and the state had no will to control. Even so, things like long 
distance trade were successfully hijacked by the state under the service-license system 
(called yinfa).
83 Obviously, the business behavior of the Chinese merchant class behaved was 
the result of the unique sandwich effect. It is thus no exaggeration that commercialization in 
China was constantly under siege.  
  Not surprisingly, therefore, merchants constantly sought alternative areas to invest in to 
stretch out their business a little.
84 Such alternative investment areas did exist. Apart from 
land property, Confucian education and official titles were purchasable.
85 In either case, 
merchants’ sector suffered capital drain, although it did not necessarily harm individual 
merchants who simply saw this drain as investment diversification to optimize returns.
86 
Indeed, as openings into the professional merchant class were limited due to the limited 
market opportunities, it was probably easier to leave the professional merchant class than 
join in. The merchants’ investment diversification in turn strengthened the merchants’ own 
market rivalries, the state and the peasantry, perpetuating the three rivalry model for the next 
round of market expansion. 
  Fifth, the entrepreneurialization of the peasantry explains why China had loosely 
connected, localized markets which were not convergent enough to integrate into a single 
market. There was practically no single currency in China.
87 For China’s multi-symbiotic 
system, a local currency (quanhuo, literally “commodity to help circulation”) was all that 
was needed to facilitate the local market.
88 Indeed, China’s stubborn divergence in dialects 
was a symptom of the same market fragmentation. In other word, the market fragmentation 
was a reliable indication of the commercial influence of the peasantry. 
  Sixth, although a few peasant sons (1–3 percent of the rural population) managed to climb 
up to join the bureaucracy (and thus represent rural interests in authorities),
89 their savings, if 
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any, were often invested in land. Retired officials, well informed as they were, often returned 
to home villages.
90 With stable returns from farming (thanks to the peasant production 
incentives),
91 the land property became an investment safe haven for the merchant class. This 
is illustrated by the market for properties in Figures 1 and 2. The end result was predictable: 
China’s urbanization was constantly under check by “ruralization.”
92  
  Last but not the least, there was an environmental and ecological consequence of the 
Chinese system, a vital factor that has been often overlooked: the Chinese family-based 
private landholding and the state-peasant alliance generated strong incentives to achieve 
sustainable farming and avoid ripping off nature for short-term benefits. Indeed, Chinese 
traditional farming technology evolved – as much in the hands of ordination peasants as in 
those of the literati – entirely around this issue of environmental and ecological 
sustainability.
93 Thus, it was no accident that by 1900 China’s agricultural land remained on 
the whole very productive after several millennia long intensive cultivation, the only case of 
this scale in world history.
94 This long-term environmental and ecological sustainability 
ultimately determined the very life span of China’s customary-mercantile sector and thus the 
longevity of Chinese civilization. No doubt, such long-term sustainability itself incurred 
great opportunity costs for giving up farming. Also, there was a biological check on the 
demand for land. Over the long run, the short life expectancy and widely practiced 
infanticide among the Chinese (commonly agreed at 35–40 years) helped keeping the 
population, and thus the aggregate demand for land, relatively stable.
95  
  In sum, the impact of the Chinese land ownership was double-edged. It encouraged 
production, supported commercialization and induced urbanization, but only to a degree. The 
ordinary Chinese peasant was market active and may have earned substantial income from 
the market. But he/she very rarely moved any further. So, the Chinese land ownership 
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resulted in a barrier to fully-grown commercialization in the rural sector, not to mention the 
technological constraint on surplus windfall and the crowding-out effect on the merchant 
class. As the Chinese peasant did not behave like a “Lewisian being” who abandons farming 
for higher salaries in the urban sector (despite the fact that a farmer and a craftsman were 
normally not interchangeable parts), it also put a brake on urbanization. In the peasant choice 
equation, there was a balance between mercantile incentives and customary considerations. 
As the peasantry formed the vast majority of the society, such a balance had profound impact 
on China’s growth trajectory in both the short run and long run.  
  This was an equilibrium created by peculiar socio-economic dynamics in Chinese society. 
Now, going back to the point of the Qin production function, in theory as long as all (or some 
of the) variables among L, K, R, T and G work against a high degree of M in a sustainable 
way, the economy may have a ceiling for commercialization. This did not necessarily lower 
China’s standards of living. This was the reality in premodern China where an equilibrium 
was reached and maintained among these variables in the Qin production function. Among 
all variables, the state (G) and peasantry (L) both played crucial roles. 
  Once this equilibrium and growth trajectory were maintained China entered a 
developmental deadlock compared with post-Renaissance Western Europe and Meiji Japan. 
But question is: How was the equilibrium maintained? 
 
VII. Maintenance and Safeguard of the Equilibrium: the Role of the State 
 
The creation of the development ceiling may have well been accidental and consequential. 
But to maintain it required a lot of readjustment because economic conditions changed over 
time. Particularly, the problem of supply of land loomed large. If the peasantry run out of 
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land, the rural sector, the pillar of the Chinese economy, would collapse and so would the 
Chinese empire. 
  From the state’s point of view, other than the peasantry, it had no groups to turn to for the 
amount of revenue and soldiers it required. So, to care about the peasant welfare (and hence 
land supply) was a product of the state’s military-financial dependency on the peasantry 
rather than a result of the noble-mindedness, thoughtfulness or sagacity of the authorities as 
romanticized by the elite. This military-financial dependency-driven alliance differed from 
the conventional patron-client relationship which widely existed in premodern Eurasia. 
Rather, it resembled in many ways the modern electorate-government relationship.
96 In this 
context, it was natural that farming became a symbol of China’s wealth and strength, and that 
the state protected and promoted farming in all possible ways, ideological, technical, and 
institutional. So, for the sake of the political and financial health of the artificially built 
empire,
97 the Chinese state was necessarily to be “agriculture and peasantry-friendly” state 
(or “agrocracy”);
98 and one of its key functions was to maintain land supply to the peasantry 
through a lasting process of territorial expansion commonly called “internal colonization.”
99 
On the other hand, powerless peasant individual depended on a powerful state to get more 
land. This was the deal for the peasants from the state-peasantry alliance. This was particular 
evident in the phenomenon of military-farming colonies. 
  In the newly-captured regions, military-farming colonies (tuntian) were systematically 
established as the first step of “internal colonization.” This was feasible because the vast 
majority of the soldiers had a peasant background, a legacy of the militia-peasantry of the 
Qin. In these colonies, land and capital (including seed, animals and other equipment) were 
provided by the government.
100 A network of agricultural supervision was established, 
attached to the agricultural board of the central government.
101 Often, land in these colonies 
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was privatized for migrants or retired soldiers as the frontiers moved outwards. These 
farming enterprises continued to exist most of time until the Qing.
102 During the Three 
Kingdoms period (220–280 A.D.), in the Wei Kingdom alone 80 percent of soldiers were 
involved in such colonies.
103 Later, under the Tang Dynasty, there were 1,147 agricultural 
colonies occupying a total area of 307,800 hectares (57,000 qing), and sometimes two-thirds 
of the Tang soldiers were employed.
104 Agricultural colonies became larger under the Song, 
Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties.
105 For instance, by 1887 Qing agricultural colonies had been 
established in 18 of the 23 provinces and occupied 3,412,310 hectares (509,300 qing), about 
6 percent of the total cultivated land of China.
106  
  As military-farming colonies served the purpose of land distribution in a transient way, the 
state directly contacted farmers and allocated land to them. This often took place when land 
supply was abundant, especially after wars. Proper law was established for such purposes. 
The best example are the practices of “land allowed to citizens” (zhantian), “land allocated to 
citizens” (shoutian), and “land equalization scheme” (juntianzhi). The first such system was 
set up in 280 A.D.
107 The most influential system of all was the “land equalization” scheme.
108 
In 485 A.D the system allowed each married couple to till 80 mu of land, 60 mu for grain and 
20 mu for 50 mulberry trees, five jujube trees and three elm trees.
109 This system was 
inherited for the next 300 years before universal land privatization took place.
110 The 
distributed land was either under lifetime leasehold or inheritable leasehold, the second best 
thing to freehold. Under Tang law, for example, such land was recognized as the “ever-
holding land” (yongyetian). The government had no right to take it away as long as it was 
under cultivation. So, practically, unlike the land in military-farming colonies, these granted 
land plots were virtually privatized at the moment of redistribution.  
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  The state interference with land supply also took the forms of nation-wide land 
equalization schemes (juntian zhi), common from the fifth to tenth centuries, and large-scale 
internal migration for farming resettlement under nationwide schemes of “moving farmers 
from over-crowded regions to thinly populated regions” (yizhai bukuan), common from the 
fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
111 These schemes aimed at eliminating unemployed 
labor and idle land and thus clearing the labor and land markets. To take the farming 
resettlement schemes as an example, the first recorded government-sponsored migration 
scheme took place during the Qin, and half a million people benefited from moving to the 
south.
112 The most effective schemes in later periods included mass migration to marginal 
lands in the western region of Sichuan (from the Yuan to Qing) called “populating Sichuan 
from Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong” (huguang tian sichuan) and offshore Taiwan (during 
the Ming–Qing).
113 Its effectiveness can be testified by the Sichuan case. From 1661 to 1753, 
Sichuan’s share of land under cultivation in China’s total increased 28 times (from 0.22 to 
6.25 percent).
114 This undoubtedly contributed to the overall expansion of the rural sector. 
The Taiwan scheme began with the initiative of Zheng Zhilong (1604–61), an official in 
Fujian, who organized several tens of thousands of emigrants from Fujian to Taiwan to take 
up farming as part of an effort in famine relief.
115 Later, the Qing government resumed the 
scheme. In the 1680s, registered able-bodied men in Taiwan numbered 16,000. By the early 
eighteenth century, that population had increased over 60 times to one million people.
116 With 
the Chinese landholding system, such population growth also implies rapid expansion of the 
rural sector. As internal migration inevitably loosened up the existing kinship-lineage ties, it 
is clearly that kinship and lineage were largely exogenous for perpetuating the Chinese 
landed family-cum-farms.
117
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  To stabilize the landholding situation and thus the rural economy, the state sometimes 
imposed restrictions on land sale. Land transaction, under the military-farming colony 
programs and land equalization schemes, was barred sometimes even after privatization. 
Under the Ming, subject to official approval, land transactions were limited within the local 
district to prevent run-away market speculations.
118
  More over, despite the state initiatives in increasing land supply, from time to time, the 
expansion of China’s territory came to a temporary halt. With the relative scarcity of land, 
China’s landholding pattern began to evolve with a main line of freehold of a sole owner 
with complete rights over the land together with a supplementary line of divided rights 
between ownership of the land and long-term leaseholding for tilling the same land 
(yongdianquan, literally “permanent leaseholding rights”). Under long-term leaseholding, the 
landowner had no power to interfere with the production process and marketing activities of 
the leaseholders as long as the rent was paid. It was a second best choice over freehold and 
many of the favorable incentives were preserved. A secondary market was developed 
simultaneously to trade/ mortgage leases.
119 By the tenth century under the Song, law was 
established to protect and regulate leaseholding rights called “permanent leaseholding 
rights.”
120 Similar laws were passed during the Ming-Qing.
121 Thus, the split of the free 
holding and leaseholding rights of the same land became institutionalized. As a result, the 
door for further splitting property rights was wide open. Gradually, during the Ming-Qing, 
fixed rent (tiebanzu, literally “iron-hard rent”) replaced sharecropping to accommodate 
multiple partial landholders. Also during the Ming-Qing, the split of rights occurred in 
leaseholding itself in the form of a multi-partial landholding rights of “surface or topsoil 
cultivation rights (tianmianquan),” “subsoil or base land rights (tiandiquan)” and numerous 
other sub-rights.
122 All the partial ownership rights were subject to trade and mortgage. The 
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emergence of division in land property rights had a knock-on effect on water rights for 
irrigation.
123
  Most interestingly, in many areas the leaseholding property rights took over free holding 
rights and became the prime rights. They were in high demand in trade and market 
speculation. This situation is shown from the return-yielding ratio between the free holding 
property rights (for the primary rent) and the leaseholding property rights (for the secondary 
rent) which, for example, was about 0.75 at the end of the sixteenth century in Fujian, a 
mountainous region known for land scarcity.
124 Accordingly, the market price for free holding 
rights was sometimes much lower than that of the leaseholding rights for the same land. So 
much so, there was a strong trend for large landholders to divide their properties into smaller 
plots, sell the free holding rights but retain the leaseholding rights in order to capture the 
economic benefits. In such a twist, free holding rights became inferior to leaseholding.
125 But 
a new Pareto optimum was reached among various landholding rights in different regions. 
  When the land supply was given, the geographic distribution of various landholding 
patterns and rights was ultimately determined by the total factor productivity of different 
regions. So, generally speaking, the higher the multiple cropping index the further divided 
were landholding rights. Thus, in the Yellow River Region, where the multiple cropping 
index was at best 1.5 per year, freehold prevailed. In the Pearl River Delta where 3–4 crops a 
year could be expected, multiple rights were common.
126 Here, new technology effectively 
delayed the onslaught of diminishing returns. With it, the “diseconomies of scale” in farming 
underpinned China’s landholding evolution. Regardless of the nuances of landholding rights 
under historical evolution, the very nature of the peasantry (as a landholding class) and the 
rural economy (as a private economy) remained unchanged. So did the center of economic 
gravity and the developmental ceiling. 
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  Finally, given the constant threat from external invasions, the Great Wall was purposely 
built to shield China’s farming zones from plunder by northern nomads, which made China 
the first and only “walled empire” in the entire history of the world. This was undoubtedly an 
effort to safeguard land supply within. The astronomical inputs of capital, labor and materials 
in the wall may be viewed as evidence of power abuse by the Qin emperor. However, they 
also manifested the unprecedented political commitment for the state-peasantry alliance, an 
extremely important but often totally ignored fact in Chinese history. After all, the wall was 
built, maintained and guarded by peasants and their soldier sons until the Ming.
127  
  So, overall, the Qin physiocratic approach and formula – land ownership and Great Wall – 
continued to be valid for more than two millennia although the Qin itself was a short 
régime.
128 The result is stunning: China’s territory expanded in all possible directions: from 
its northern core to much of the south, west and Korea during the Western Han (206 B.C.– 23 
A.D.), to Fujian, part of Turkistan (Xinjiang) and Vietnam during the Tang, to Taiwan and 
Sichuan during the Ming and to Mongolia, Manchuria and Turkistan during the Qing (1644–
1911).
129 Considering that before the late Qing China’s population fluctuated between 20 
million and 80 million vis-à-vis a land-mass as big as Europe or the US, the overall land 
supply was favorable thanks to the overland expansionist policy. 
  The second parameter associated with the Chinese agrocracy was its tax régime. Heavy 
taxation can cancel the benefit of an increase land supply by lowering peasant net returns and 
sending the negative signal for future production and investment. To moderate the state’s 
rent-seeking propensity and appetite is a worldwide challenge in history. In the West, much 
has been depended on modern democracy. In premodern China, it was Confucian code of 
conduct for statesmanship. Since the Western Han (206 B.C.–8 B.C.), Confucian ideology 
was officially chosen to nurture and massage this state-peasant relationship because of the 
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political disaster caused by the Qin’s ruthless Legalist approach.
130 Unlike Legalism, 
Confucianism gave the imperial state a human face which theorized the need for protecting 
people’s livelihood for the sake of the rulers’ own interest: if a ruler practiced physiocracy, 
he achieved “sage-like humanity” (ren), and his reign was secure.
131 Confucius never 
preached to the peasantry only to the ruling, mainly the literati.
132 This is clearly stated in 
Mencius’ well-known maxims that “food is the people’s god” (min yishi weitian) and 
“people are the foundation of a régime” (minben). The essence of Confucian economic 
values of is simply “benevolent rule over an egalitarian economy.” Confucian ideology did 
not create the state-peasantry exchange.
133 It only moralized the state’s military-financial 
dependency on the peasantry and thus moralized the state-peasantry alliance.
134 All these led 
to the moral economy of taxation in China. Taxes on agriculture were normally low (barely 
over 10 percent of total output) and predictable.
135 Later, the Manchu Qing state, which 
managed to reduce the resistance from the Chinese to the minimum,
136 went as far as freezing 
for good the total tax revenue from agriculture despite the trend of increasing land 
reclamation and yield level (yongbu jiafu, literally “never increase tax”),
137 a policy which 
was carefully observed in 1715–1840.  
  If internal colonization and land distribution were not physiocracy-specific enough, there 
was a repertoire of policies to assist landholding farmers with farming technology, including 
the recording and accumulation of farming knowledge, the publication and circulation of 
agronomic books, provision of farming advisory services, distribution of new equipment and 
seed varieties.
138 The most celebrated economy-wide government initiatives were probably 
the introduction of (1) heavy iron ploughshare for dry farming during the Han, (2) early-
ripening rice during the Northern Song, (3) cotton during the Yuan, and (4) and sweet 
potatoes during the Ming.
139 Public works for flood control in farming regions, which made 
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China known to the outside world, should be also added. What these activities did for the 
economy was (1) to push local production towards the “production probability frontier” (in 
the case of diffusion of the “best practice”) and (2) to out-stretch the frontier itself (in the 
case of new seed varieties and new tools). The impact was undoubtedly positive in the short 
run. In the long run though, it helped shaping skill intensive farming which proved double-
edged. 
  Furthermore, by the Ming (r. 1368-1644), disaster prevention (such as water control) and 
famine relief were both regarded by society as citizens’ entitlements and routine duties of the 
state.
140 The peasantry was undoubtedly the main targeted beneficiary. Government rescue 
projects often provided the poor with low interest loans to cover difficult periods of 
temporary shortage so that the poor did not have to sell their land. The best example was the 
“green-sprout loan scheme” (qingmiaofa) during the eleventh century under the 
administration of Wang Anshi (1021–86).
141  
  Also since the Western Han, as part of the routine physiocratic “house-keeping,” the state 
was committed to confining merchants, a package called “looking after farmers and 
confining merchants” (zhongnong yishang). Undoubtedly, measures such as state monopoly 
and profiteering with some “key commodities” (salt, iron and wine for example), strict 
licensing control (often applied to long-distance trade) and occasional bans (on maritime 
trade) created disincentives among professional merchants and were helpful in consolidating 
the state-peasant alliance. But, this check on the growth of merchants was secondary and its 
importance should thus not be overplayed as many have. Considering that the interests of the 
peasantry and those of the merchant class were often mutually exclusive, much of the 
effective constraint on merchants came from the peasantry itself, as indicated by 
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“entrepreneurialization of the peasantry” and “agrianization of the merchants,” a process in 
which merchants joined the landholding club through investing in land. 
 
VII. Maintenance and Safeguard of the Equilibrium: the Role of the Peasantry 
 
A great number of scholars believe that China’s problem was related to the upper and 
minority classes. They usually ask the following questions: were China’s “inefficiencies” 
rooted in the Chinese mindset established by the elite? Were they the consequences of a 
coercive, rent-seeking state, or a weak merchant class, or a strong landlord class? Or, were 
they the consequences a combination of several or all such variables?
142 This is approach 
compatible with the view that China’s developmental ceiling was a deliberate and calculated 
result. But, could it be possible that the developmental ceiling was set up by millions of 
ordinary Chinese instead of the upper and minority classes? In other words, could it be the 
case that there was no “leadership” issue (a key concept for many social historians) regarding 
China’s developmental ceiling in light of the multi-symbiotic system and its function?  
  The findings of the present research strongly indicate affirmative answers to this question. 
Although it is a widely accepted cliché that decisions and choices were the preserve of the 
rulers – the Chinese monarch and his bureaucracy – and that the peasantry only had the 
obligation to obey, evidence shows that overall the monarch and bureaucracy did not in 
effect have the resources nor the will to monopolize those decisions and that the peasantry 
often disobeyed.
143 So, the economic decision-making in traditional China was by and large a 
decentralized process (including what to produce, how to produce it, when to produce it and 
for whom to produce it). This was due to the private and non-feudal nature of the Chinese 
economy in general and the rural economy in particular. Under the multi-symbiotic system 
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the ordinary Chinese were categorically individualistic, making far more decisions than one 
might think.  
  If so, the question is who these “ordinary Chinese” really were. Indeed, some scholars pay 
more attention to China’s population itself as a whole and typically view China’s problem as 
that of the biomass of the Chinese race, discarding class division (or anything similar) in 
Chinese society. This echoes the aforementioned opinion that China’s developmental 
trajectory was a result of a “natural course” and thus no individual or group was truly 
responsible for China’s fate. In other words, the population was mindless, making decision 
randomly. But, could it be possible that millions of ordinary Chinese had something in 
common economically so much so that they made similar rational choices. Could it also be 
possible for these private rational choices to steer the economy and maintain China’s 
developmental ceiling?  
  From the analysis of the state-peasant alliance, private land ownership, agricultural 
dominance and agrocracy, the peasantry was not at all a passive factor. And, the peasant 
economy was not at all “free-drifting” without a direction. Like the Chinese state, the 
peasantry had the same vested interest in maintaining the agricultural dominance in the 
economy. The peasantry was also responsible for the creation of the Chinese empire.  
  But due to its seemingly humble and unorganized status, the role of the peasantry has been 
notoriously neglected. As a result, numerous works have been done on the subject of how 
anti-commerce and anti-merchants the Chinese state was in a school of though called “buro-
determinism.”
144 This “buro-determinism” has a basic flaw: it ignores the political and 
economic bargaining power of the legally free, landholding peasantry in a predominantly 
private, autonomous economy. In particular, it completely overlooked the phenomenon of 
frequent rebellions by armed peasants in Chinese history. It was these rebellions that 
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ultimately determined China’s growth path in the very long term. In other words, China’s 
equilibrium with the Qin production function was not maintained by the minority but by the 
majority. It was not maintained by peaceful administration and manipulation, but by violence 
to veto and weed out an undesirable government, including the unwanted alien régime of the 
Mongols. This was imperative when the Confucian state became corrupt and its policy 
deviated from the physiocratic norm. 
  A new view developed in this study introduces two elements in the model of maintaining 
China’s equilibrium: (1) rational choices among the seemingly powerless and voiceless 
majority, and (2) the collective bargaining power of the landholding peasantry in determining 
state affairs. 
  The truth is although the state-peasant alliance was in normal circumstances able to 
transcend power-abusive emperors/officials,
145 things did go wrong. When a deviant state 
harmed the rural sector too much through, for example, excessive taxation (in kind, cash or 
labor services) affecting the critical mass of the peasantry, the seemingly docile peasants 
showed their original militia color and rose up in arms to topple unpopular régimes. The 
glorious Qin was the first to go. Indeed, all the main dynasties after the Qin – Western Han, 
Eastern Han, Jin, Sui, Yuan and Ming – suffered this fate. The rule of the Tang and Northern 
Song was seriously weakened by peasant rebellions, which greatly contributed to their 
collapses. In the Qing case, the Manchus only managed to save its neck under attacks from 
the Taipings and Nians thanks to military and financial aid from the West. All this 
demonstrates the effectiveness of peasant rebellions in Chinese history.
146
  Seven characteristics of Chinese rebellions can be identified. First, the Chinese peasantry 
easily qualified as the most rebellious among all known farming classes in world history. 
From 210 B.C. to 1900 A.D. there were in all 2,106 major peasant rebellions in China, each on 
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average lasting for seven years with 226,000 participants. Rebels were responsible for 
establishing at least 48 régimes.
147 The sheer number of rebellions in China suggests that 
socio-political and socio-economic controls under the empire system were rather loose, 
enough to allow separate power centers to rise and attract large number of followers. It also 
implies that, compatible with private land-holding, the peasantry enjoyed a considerable 
degree of political freedom and mobility. Most important of all, it indicates that common 
interests were shared among peasant individuals. Second, Chinese peasant rebellions were 
clearly institution-driven and incentives-motivated. The political programs of the rebels 
always included land distribution and private land-ownership. Third, it was the well-to-do 
regions that were most ready to rebel against state deviation from the physiocratic norm. The 
reason was that well-to-do peasants had a much lower threshold of tolerance for economic 
hardships and they had the necessary resources to rebel.
148 Fourth, Chinese rebellions had 
little, if at all, to do with natural disasters. The alleged stereotype causality between 
rebellions and natural disasters is faulty. Fifth, the Chinese rebels were no revolutionaries. 
What they fought for was to maintain or re-establish the old socio-economic structure instead 
of changing it. There was no exception throughout Chinese history, including the Taiping 
despite its Christian-communist camouflage. The rebels were not even “class-strugglers” as 
the door for class mobility was wide open. This explains why after their victories, peasant 
rebels often passed the state power on to Confucians. In this context, Chinese peasants were 
die-hard “physiocratic fundamentalists” and their rebellions “physiocratic uprisings.”  
  Peasant rebellions had the moral support and justification of Confucianism which openly 
supports the peasants’ right to rebel and maintains that a bad government does not deserve to 
last.
149 Confucians themselves, including Confucius’ own descendant Kong Fu (c. 264 B.C.–
208 B.C.), played an important part in rebellions.
150 As a result, the expectation of a well-
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behaved physiocratic state was very high among ordinary peasants. Thus, in China the 
peasantry always had its political-economic agenda, while merchants never managed to have 
their own. This is again paradoxical: (1) docile and scattered individual peasants were able to 
take on the centralized state and weed out a bad government; (2) the guru of Chinese 
statecraft (all of which was about order) was on the rebel’s side. 
  The impact of rebellions was obvious. Apart from the deadly consequence to a corrupt 
régime, they functioned as a haunting deterrent to policy deviation from the physiocratic 
norm.
151 Indeed, the correlation between a heavy tax burden on the rural sector and armed 
rebellions was so obvious that increasing taxes became a taboo.
152 With such a double check, 
militarily (rebellions) and morally (Confucian values), even when the state did drift away 
from physiocracy, it never lasted long. Therefore, it was sheer accident that the Song 
commercial adventure ended with the coming the Tartar–Mongol invaders before it was 
ended by Chinese rebels, as public resentment built up against the deviant Song state.
153  
  Rebellions also effectively reduced population density and increased the supply of land at 
the very least (see Table 3). With the heavy loss of lives who can be seen as “physiocratic 
martyrs,” the pre-rebellion political-economic deterioration was reversed for the short run.  
 
Table 3 appears about here 
 
  There is no exaggeration to state that since c. 100 B.C. the Confucianism-backed, 
landholding, rebellion-ready, militia-peasantry became a principal “shaper” of China’s state 
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The overall convergent system of the political economy of Imperial China can be sketched in 
Figure 5 which more or less explains itself.
154  
 
Figure 5 appears about here 
 
  Now it becomes clear that Imperial China had a well-established, carefully-balanced and 
jealously-guarded incentive system (centered by private landholding rights) upon which a 
functional economic structure was built (a multi-symbiotic economic system under the 
dominance of the rural sector). The initial drive for institutional changes state-building 
triggered by a military revolution. By granting the militia peasantry private landholding 
rights, the Chinese state let the genie out of the bottle who was able to inflict damage as well 
as create wealth for a régime. After the Qin, the state’s military-financial dependency on the 
peasantry continued under the constant pressure of nomadic invasions from the north.  
  On the other hand, from the economic point of view, as the Qin system continued yielding 
handsome dividends for society, a winning formula was developed: together with the 
proliferation of landed farming households, the advantage of the diseconomies of scale (and 
indeed the economies of scope) in farming and handicrafts was exploited to the full;
155 and 
with it, paradoxically, the benefit of the economies of scale in empire building was achieved. 
China expanded to its physical limits while its family-cum-farms thrived and well distributed 
across a vast territory. In the process, the peasantry obtained more land properties, and the 
state more revenue: a Pareto optimum.  
  To allow the Qin system to continue in the long run, a balance between the market 
economy and customary economy and a balance between a seemingly mighty state and an 
ocean of powerless smallholders needed to be maintained. China did just that thanks to a set 
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of self-regulating mechanisms developed despite market penetration, state malfunction and 
individual emperor’s megalomania.
156 The most important developments were the elasticity 
in land supply, adoption of Confucian code of conduct for statesmanship and peasant 
rebellions.  
  These self-regulating mechanisms led to a structural equilibrium among three interlocking 
components. There was no institutional harrier to the maintenance of the equilibrium. The 
Qin system proved to be compatible not only with the market but also with those “Chinese-
specific” factors such as Confucianism, kinship and lineage. After some eight centuries’ 
practice, by the Tang, the social, political, economic and ecological convergence in China 
was so strong that it fundamentally changed the landscape of East Asian mainland for good. 
  China’s multi-symbiotic system was sophisticated, efficient and flexible enough to 
generate economic growth, military power and political influence for China which remained 
unchallenged for one millennium in Asia from the Tang until the Opium War. Until the early 
nineteenth century the developmental ceiling had no severe negative impact on China, a 
civilization which possessed the largest population in the world, the greatest land mass in 
Asia, an impressive literacy rate, respectable material life and indisputable comparative 
advantage with a number of commodities in great demand world-wide. China’s multi-
symbiotic system was thus a premodern success story: it did not show any disadvantage in 
per capita income until 1700. A “Ricardian world” (in the orthodox sense with a perfect or 
nearly perfect market, tangible comparative advantages and extensive division of labor), 
China on its own did not automatically develop capitalism or capitalist industrialization even 
given sufficient time.
157 So, China’s structural equilibrium proved to be dynamic and 
recurrent: a developmental ceiling resulting in a lasting economic optimum. What made 
China so remarkable was thus not the multi-symbiotic system but its long-term sustainability. 
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In this context, the Chinese state was never “too strong” or “too weak:” it was just the right 
kind/degree that China’s symbiosis needed. The same can be said about China’s market, 
technology and Confucian ideology. It is unfair to label them as detriments to indigenous 
growth.  
  Fundamental changes had to wait until China lost its supremacy in a century’s long, 
repeated defeats until 1940.
158 The “weakness” of China’s rational, harmless developmental 
ceiling suddenly loomed large.
159 This raises the issue of just how the Chinese system should 
be judged by a new world standard, a standard which emerged after the Industrial Revolution 
and qualitatively differed from any previous ones.
160 One thing is sure, considering its 
humiliating, all-round defeat, China’s developmental ceiling, which accommodated so much 
growth before, appeared to be a deadlock in the end.
161 Although it may have been able to 
compete sometimes with the West in qualitative terms, China lost out in qualitative terms.
162 
In a final twist, China’s growth asset now became its liability – a paradox of its ultimate 
form. 
  Undoubtedly China can be judged by dual standards, normative (Needham’s) or positive 
(Jones’s). The Chinese puzzle itself is, however, methodologically neutral. It can be taken in 
either relative terms (compared to Western Europe) or absolute terms (to measure China’s 
actual achievement against its own best performance). The present study shows that, with 
logical and factual consistency and a positive, institutional framework the puzzle can indeed 
be solved. 
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